

minority  
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# Peoples under Threat 2018

[www.peoplesunderthreat.org](http://www.peoplesunderthreat.org)

Mass killings and other atrocities continue to threaten civilian populations, especially those belonging to minorities and indigenous peoples, in many parts of the world. In recent years it is non-state armed groups that have dominated headlines and been associated with many of the most serious human rights abuses. Nigeria and Niger continue to experience major upheavals as a result of the continued violence perpetrated by the Boko Haram insurgency and the response to it. In Iraq and Libya, both ranking high in the index, the threat from the so-called Islamic State (IS) may be more contained but the proliferation of other militias leaves populations at grave risk. While in many cases governments themselves have served to escalate the violence, these examples nevertheless appear to support the picture of mass killings as a reflection of weak governance and lawlessness – civilian populations, especially those belonging to minorities and indigenous peoples, in many instances, an archetypical symptom of the ‘failed state’.

Yet a look at the index also highlights how many countries featured there are in fact defined by creeping authoritarianism and the growing concentration of powers with the state. While countries in the midst of civil conflicts and mass violence continue to feature highly, a striking development is the ranking of a number of countries not traditionally associated with these threats. In Turkey, for example, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has managed to consolidate control of the country amidst a mass purge of journalists, public officials and teachers in the wake of a failed coup attempt in 2016. In Venezuela, too, a similar pattern is in place as the government under Nicolas Maduro has violently quelled protests against its rule. And in Ethiopia, amidst intensifying protests in the marginalized Oromia region, the government has resorted to brutal violence to quell dissent in clashes that have claimed hundreds of lives. In all these cases, and in many others elsewhere, the pressure on civil society has only increased. This has played a major role in the uncertain human rights environments in these countries.

Non-state armed groups continue to play a central role in the escalation of conflict in many of the highest ranking countries on the list, such as Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Somalia, driven by political rivalries, extremist ideology or control over resources. But

non-state armed groups often emerge in contexts where the state itself has contributed to the erosion of human rights and good governance. In Sudan, for instance, the actions of the government itself or its associated militias have largely rendered meaningless its function as a keeper of the peace.

There is also, however, broader consideration of the role that the international community has played in exacerbating the situations in many countries. The piecemeal response, in various conflict zones across the world, has ranged from inaction and continued inactivity for responsible parties to disastrous military intervention. In Myanmar, the recent brutal treatment of the Rohingya minority has been met by a weak response from the international community and looks unlikely to be resolved in the near future. While inadequate international pressure has made it easier for authoritarian governments and their enablers to exercise violence against particular populations, international involvement has also actively deepened faultlines in some of the highest ranked countries in the index. In Syria, ranked again at the very top of the table, the military support offered by Iran and Russia to the Assad regime has contributed to a spike in civilian deaths, while bombing by the international coalition against IS has also led to an undisclosed number of civilian casualties. Equally significant is the engagement of Saudi Arabia in the deteriorating situation in Yemen. What began as a relatively contained conflict between the government and Houthi rebels has broadened into an increasingly sectarian war, with devastating airstrikes that have killed many Yemeni civilians being carried out by Saudi Arabia, at the head of an international coalition supported by France, the UK and the US among others.

Mass displacement continues to define many of the worst affected countries. The uprooting of tens of thousands of civilians, often belonging to minority and indigenous communities, not only exacerbates ongoing crises, but also creates the conditions for further disruption and insecurity in the coming months and years. This is the case in South Sudan, where protracted civil conflict along ethnic lines has displaced one in three civilians.

*Peoples under Threat* identifies those country situations around the world where communities face the greatest risk of genocide, mass killing, or systematic violent repression. Based on current indicators from authoritative sources (see p. 9),

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## Major risers 2018

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Rank	Rise in rank	Country	Groups	Total
3	3	South Sudan	Murle, Nuer, Dinka, Anuak, Jie, Kachipo	21.000
10	4	Ethiopia	Anuak, Afars, Oromo, Somalis, smaller minorities	17.767
22	7	Turkey	Kurds, Alevis, Roma, Armenians and other Christians	13.488
28	3	Chad	'Black African' groups, Arabs, Southerners	12.428
35	3	Venezuela	Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants	11.309
41	7	Mozambique	Northerners	10.845
46	3	Niger	Djerema-Songhai, Hausa, Tuaregs	10.326
48	8	Turkmenistan	Uzbeks, Russians, Kazakhs, religious minorities	10.151
49	18	Congo (Rep.)	Lari, M'Boshi, Aka	10.147
50	4	Djibouti	Afars	10.123

*Peoples under Threat* has been compiled every year since 2005 to provide early warning of potential future mass atrocities. *Peoples under Threat* highlights more than twenty situations with pressing risks – states either at the top of the index or those rising swiftly up it. It is estimated that these situations will account for the vast majority of civilians who will suffer mass killings in the coming year.

### Rising threats

Following a year where **South Sudan's** conflict regions were hit by famine, the country's civil war entered its fifth year in 2018, with new bouts of fighting spreading. The conflict began as a rift between President Salva Kiir and then-Vice President Riek Machar in 2013, each mobilizing supporters along ethnic lines. Both sides have perpetrated widespread abuses against civilian populations, including sexual violence, destruction of property and indiscriminate attacks. Various peace deals

have been signed and then broken, and tens of thousands of people have been killed as a result of the conflict. Roughly a third of the population, over 4.2 million people, has been uprooted. An absence of accountability has contributed to the violence, and while previous reports have documented crimes but not perpetrators, a February 2018 UN investigation said that it had identified more than 40 South Sudanese military officers who may be responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Intensified political repression and armed conflict have resulted in **Ethiopia's** elevation to the highest reaches of the *Peoples under Threat* table. While a 10-month state of emergency was lifted in August, security personnel continued to crack down on political opposition, killing more than 1,000 protestors during the course of the year and arresting tens of thousands of others. Severe restrictions on freedom of expression and association as well as arbitrary detention and torture remain pressing

issues. In Oromia and Somali regional states, fighting between ethnic Oromo and Somalis escalated and killed hundreds of people while displacing hundreds of thousands more. Inter-ethnic discord, territorial competition and self-perpetuating cycles of violence have fueled the conflict. Many serious abuses have been attributed to the 'Liyu police', a paramilitary outfit created by the Somali regional state.

In the context of an ongoing state of emergency following the failed coup in 2016, the government in **Turkey** continues to suffocate political opposition. More than 110,000 public officials have been summarily dismissed for unspecified links to a failed coup attempt in July 2016, while around 50,000 people, including many journalists, academics and human rights activists, have been arrested on politically motivated grounds. A referendum in April 2017 set the stage for Turkey to adopt a presidential system of governance: a major setback for the rule of law, it further consolidates President Erdoğan's increasingly authoritarian hold on power. Turkish armed forces repeatedly clashed with Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) fighters, particularly in Diyarbakir governorate, leading to large-scale displacement and hundreds of civilian casualties, particularly affecting the country's Kurdish community. IS continues to carry out periodic attacks on civilians and security personnel.

In **Chad**, government authorities have ratcheted up pressure on critics. Peaceful assemblies have been repeatedly banned and the rights to organize, associate and speak freely have been violated. Boko Haram, while operating primarily in Nigeria, has continued to exploit porous borders and perpetrate attacks around Lake Chad, striking civilians and security personnel. In addition to Chadian citizens displaced by the violence, more than 400,000 refugees from neighbouring countries uprooted by Boko Haram's insurgency live in dire conditions in camps, including in Baga Sola, a lakeshore town in the west of the country. To better combat the spread of Islamist militancy in the Sahel, in July, along with neighbouring countries, Chad launched a multinational counterterrorism task force.

Also a founding member, **Niger** has contended with the spread of attacks, numbering at least 70, by Boko Haram, the Sahel-based IS affiliate, and other militants. In March, the government declared a state of emergency in the western areas bordering Mali and launched a major military operation after

attacks on soldiers and civilians by armed groups in Tillabéry and Tahoua. The state of emergency in the Diffa region was renewed as attacks by armed groups continued. Over 700 suspected Boko Haram members from Niger and Nigeria went on trial. Yet hundreds of other people, including journalists, protestors and opposition politicians, were arrested in the government's crackdown against dissent.

The political, economic and humanitarian crisis in **Venezuela** has deepened. Thousands have been injured and more than 100 killed in clashes between supporters and opponents of the government of Nicolas Maduro, which has openly manipulated the electoral system to consolidate power. Security personnel have repressed dissent through often-violent crackdowns on protest activity, including demonstrations attended by tens of thousands of people. Political opponents faced imprisonment and prosecution in military courts. Ordinary Venezuelans have suffered from a spiraling humanitarian crisis, with many unable to feed their families or access basic healthcare, leading hundreds of thousands to flee the country.

For the third consecutive year, **Mozambique** has risen in the rankings. Owing to a ceasefire in late 2016, there has been a decline in direct armed clashes between government forces and the former rebel group, now opposition party, Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO). Yet no peace agreement was reached by the end of the year, and periodic violence between security personnel and RENAMO-linked armed groups has continued. More than 60 people were killed and thousands more uprooted in the face of attacks, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, and property destruction. People with albinism, comprising an estimated 30,000, also continue to be targeted. An economic crisis is accentuating political divisions and grievances in the country.

Already one of the world's most repressive countries, **Turkmenistan** jumped eight places in the table. The country's hosting of an international martial arts competition in 2017 brought a rare degree of outside attention, and was accompanied by a clampdown on civil society. Public life remains tightly controlled, with the state punishing all unapproved forms of religious and political expression, outlawing independent human rights organizations, and jailing and torturing political dissidents with impunity. In a February show election, President Gurbanguly Berdimuhamedov

## Peoples most under threat – highest rated countries 2018

Rank	Country	Groups	Total
1	Syria	Political targets, Sunnis, Shi'a/Alawites, Yezidis, Christians, Druze, Kurds, Palestinians	28.360
2	Somalia	Minorities incl. Bantu, Benadiri and 'caste' groups (Gabooye etc.); clan members at risk in fighting incl. Hawiye, Darod, etc.	22.351
3	South Sudan	Murle, Nuer, Dinka, Anuak, Jie, Kachipo	21.000
4	Iraq	Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkmen, Christians, Mandaeans, Yezidis, Shabak, Faili Kurds, Bahá'ís, Palestinians	20.927
5	Sudan	Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit and others in Darfur; Ngok Dinka, Nuba, Beja	20.847
6	Afghanistan	Hazara, Pashtun, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Baluchis, Kuchis	20.577
7	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	Hema and Lendu, Hutu, Luba, Lunda, Tutsi/Banyamulenge, Batwa/Bambutu, other groups	19.953
8	Yemen	Zaydi Shi'a, Sunni tribes, al-Muhamasheen, Southerners	19.606
9	Pakistan	Shi'a (incl. Hazara), Ahmadis, Hindus, Christians and other religious minorities; Baluchis, Mohhajirs, Pashtun, Sindhis	18.543
10	Ethiopia	Anuak, Afars, Oromo, Somalis, smaller minorities	17.767
11	Libya	Black Libyans, Sub-Saharan migrants, Tebu, Berbers; religious targets	17.737
12	Nigeria	Ibo, Ijaw, Ogoni, Yoruba, Hausa (Muslims) and Christians in the North	17.232

was re-elected to a third term with 97.7 per cent of the vote.

Significant human rights violations persist in **Djibouti**, where independent media is essentially non-existent and critics of the government of President Ismail Omar Guelleh, re-elected in April 2016, face systematic repression. Human rights

activists, journalists and other dissenting voices have faced forms of harassment, abuse, arbitrary detention and torture. In June, military hostilities escalated when Djibouti accused Eritrea of sending troops into a disputed border region following the withdrawal of 450 Qatari peacekeepers stationed there since 2010.

In the **Republic of Congo** restrictions on freedom

of speech, press, assembly and association remain in place, alongside continued unlawful killings, politically motivated disappearances and poor treatment of detainees. Armed conflict between security forces and so-called Ninja rebels continued in Pool, where the government has conducted military operations and both sides have been accused of abuses against civilians. More than 80,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) from the area still live in dire conditions. Whether a ceasefire signed in December between the government and the rebels will halt the country's rise in the index is yet to be seen.

### Peoples at greatest risk

**Syria** remains firmly atop the *Peoples under Threat* table as its tragic conflict evolves. IS has remained in control of pockets of territory but was dealt significant blows in 2017, with its de-facto capital, Raqqa, taken in October by an alliance of Kurdish and Arab armed groups backed by a US-led coalition. Fierce fighting carried on between Islamist opposition groups against the government, which with backing by Russia, Iran and Shi'a militias continues to make territorial gains. The Assad regime, responsible for deliberate and indiscriminate attacks against civilians and the overwhelming majority of civilian deaths, has continued to use banned chemical weapons in opposition-held areas while Russia vetoes accountability measures at the UN Security Council. Turkey's invasion of the northern province of Afrin has resulted in mass displacement of the local Kurdish population and fears of forced demographic engineering. Civilian casualties from US-led coalition airstrikes have also increased significantly under the Trump administration. The death toll from the conflict, though impossible to estimate with precision, is widely believed to have climbed well over half a million, with more than 11 million people displaced in and outside the country.

**Somalia** continues to experience destabilizing armed conflict and abuses against civilians by all parties involved. Al-Shabaab has frequently attacked government and civilian targets, particularly in South-Central Somalia and Puntland, where Shabaab militants defected to IS have also fought their former group. Further civilian deaths and displacement have resulted from counterinsurgency operations by the Somali National Army, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops and other foreign forces,

including US aircraft whose strikes have become less precise and much more frequent. Inter-clan conflict drags on, but following a protracted political process, Somalia gained a new president in February, inspiring optimism cutting across society. Yet in one of the deadliest terror attacks in modern world history, a truck bombing struck Mogadishu in October and killed more than 500 people. Parts of the country were on the brink of famine in 2017, and by the end of the year over 6 million people were in need of humanitarian assistance.

**Iraq** remains near the top of the table despite the considerable losses in terms of manpower and territory suffered by IS in 2017. Fighting displaced an estimated 3.2 million Iraqis and the nine-months-long battle for Mosul, formerly the principal IS stronghold in Iraq, ended in July. IS perpetrated atrocities on a vast scale, yet of the roughly 10,000 civilians killed in the fighting, at least one third were at the hands of Iraqi government forces and their allies, which included mostly-Shi'a sectarian militias, Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) forces and the US-led international coalition. Diplomatic and military tensions between Baghdad and the KRG persist, having peaked prior to a September referendum defiantly favoring Kurdish independence. Despite positive rhetoric by some politicians in the run-up to May 2018 parliamentary elections, sectarian tensions and grievances towards the government persist, particularly in Anbar and Ninewa governorates as well as Diyala, where IS may seek to regroup and re-ignite cycles of violence.

The government in **Sudan** continues its violent repression and violations of basic civil and political rights. Government forces and paramilitaries continue to attack civilians, particularly IDPs. 2017 marked the 15<sup>th</sup> year of the war in Darfur between the mainly ethnic Arab government and the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF), an alliance between mostly ethnic African armed groups. Principally in Darfur, the conflict between various tribes has continued despite repeated ceasefires as the underlying issues – in particular, conflicts over cattle and arable land – have not been resolved. As a result, violence along ethnic lines, and between farmers and cattle herders, continues to occur and has resulted in large numbers of civilian casualties. Fighting in South Kordofan and Blue Nile states between the government and rebels has lulled, due to peace negotiations and rebel factionalization, but risks re-igniting. 2018 marks

ten years of President Omar al-Bashir's defiance of two International Criminal Court arrest warrants for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes allegedly committed in Darfur.

Conflict in **Afghanistan** continues to take a terrible toll on civilians – over 10,000 lost their lives or suffered injuries in 2017. Fighting between the government and its international backers, on one hand, and various Islamist militant groups on the other, has raged on. While the expanded use of US airstrikes has increased civilian casualties, US President Donald Trump has pledged to send more troops to Afghanistan. The Taliban, having expanded its territorial control, continues to attack security personnel and civilians, and an increase in the activities of the Afghan branch of IS has occurred in several provinces, especially Nangarhar. A string of bombings and attacks by these groups, including a truck bomb in May 2017 that killed more than 150 people, has particularly afflicted the capital Kabul and other urban areas. Numerous other suicide bombings have also occurred, with many specifically targeting the Hazara Shi'a minority.

The **Democratic Republic of the Congo** has been shaken by multiple armed conflicts, uprooting nearly 2 million people in 2017. In Kasai province, Kamuina Nsapu rebels, who are mostly ethnic Luba, clashed with government troops, who have been accused by the UN of dumping bodies in mass graves. A government-sponsored militia, the Bana Mura, has also been involved in committing widespread atrocities, frequently against civilians. People remain unable to escape conflict in the eastern Kivu provinces, where more than 100 armed groups actively oppose the government or each other, including a new coalition in South Kivu which took control of numerous villages near Lake Tanganyika. Political violence and repression linked to President Joseph Kabila's unconstitutional hold on power have further destabilized the country: while elections are supposed to take place in December 2018, they could occasion further political violence.

The poorest country in the Arab world, **Yemen**, has suffered nearly three years of war between Houthi rebels and a Saudi-led, international coalition supporting exiled President Abd-Rabbo Mansour Hadi. While both sides are responsible for a litany of abuses against civilians, the coalition – with material and diplomatic support from the US, UK and France – has launched numerous

airstrikes which have killed and injured thousands of civilians. Many have been indiscriminate and disproportionate, with some striking hospitals, weddings and funerals. Al-Qaida and IS offshoots continue to further destabilize the country's southern governorates. Yemen's conflict has caused widespread food shortages and the largest cholera outbreak ever recorded in a single country in a given year. According to the UN's humanitarian chief, Yemen risks becoming the world's worst humanitarian disaster in half a century.

**Pakistan** continues to be wracked by insecurity. Several Islamist militant groups regularly mount attacks against both security personnel and civilians. The Pakistani Taliban (TTP) has continued to clash with government forces in the country's north-west, where Pashtun communities have suffered heavily at the hands of both sides. Armed secessionists in Baluchistan have specifically targeted civilians from other provinces or laborers working on infrastructure projects. At the same time, Shi'a Hazara living in the provincial capital, Quetta, remain the target of repeated attacks by extremist groups. In February, IS declared responsibility for a suicide attack on a Sufi shrine in Sindh province, killing around 90 people and wounding hundreds. A more general climate of intolerance and hostility towards minorities including Shi'a, Ahmadis, Hindus, and Christians persists in the country, promoted through state institutions and societal attitudes.

Rival governments in the west and east of **Libya** remain unwilling to reach a power-sharing agreement. Affiliated armed forces and militias continue to clash, in some cases perpetrating summary executions of captured opponents, as well as committing various abuses against civilians. The Libya-based branch of IS lost territory during 2017, but continues to operate in the country, attacking civilians, government targets and other armed groups. Of the nearly 3,000 migrants who died en route and nearly 200,000 others who crossed the Mediterranean by boat to reach Europe in 2017, the majority departed from Libya. Those who are contained in Libya according to a joint EU-Libyan strategy are known to face brutal and inhumane treatment at the hands of detention centre guards, militias, and smugglers. Towards the end of the year reports surfaced of African migrants being auctioned in Libyan slave markets.

While **Nigeria's** armed forces have had some success in pushing back Boko Haram, civilians have

still felt the deadly impact of ongoing conflict. Boko Haram has stepped up its use of women and children as suicide bombers in urban centres, particularly in Borno state. Although the death toll has decreased from previous years, according to UNICEF, ongoing conflict has destroyed nearly 75 per cent of north-eastern Nigeria's water and sanitation infrastructure, leaving 3.6 million people without access to clean water. Exacerbated by the environmental impacts of desertification, the conflict over arable land in the Middle Belt region between predominantly Christian farmers of Berom and Tiv tribes and the mainly Muslim Fulani pastoralists continued, claiming over 600 lives.

That **Myanmar** is not among the top-12 highest ranked countries is a grim reflection of the gravity of situations elsewhere. Following an attack by Rohingya militants on security personnel in August 2017, military forces and local Buddhist militias began attacking Muslim Rohingya in 'clearance operations' in Rakhine state. Rohingya have long

faced systematic persecution, including having been rendered stateless by the government. Mass killings of Rohingya civilians, torching of hundreds of villages and widespread sexual violence has led nearly 700,000 Rohingya to flee their homes and more than 10,000 deaths by the end of the year. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has said 'the situation seems a textbook example of ethnic cleansing' and international observers have suggested acts of genocide have taken place. Elsewhere in the country, the peace process with ethnic armed groups made no meaningful progress and fighting intensified in Kachin and northern Shan states. Despite condemnation, the displaced Rohingya now face a growing humanitarian catastrophe in neighbouring Bangladesh, while also contending with a government that is actively seeking to repatriate many refugees in the near future.

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## How is *Peoples under Threat* calculated?

Since the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, our ability to identify those situations most likely to lead to genocide or mass killing has improved. A number of comparative studies of the factors preceding historic episodes of political mass killing had been undertaken since the 1970s, but it was not until the 1990s that researchers pioneered quantitative longitudinal analysis of a wide range of such factors, enabling the testing of different causal hypotheses. This research enabled the identification of those preconditions that were most likely to lead to genocide and political mass murder (politicide).

Minority Rights Group International (MRG) has drawn on these research findings to construct the *Peoples under Threat* table, although responsibility for the final table is exclusively our own. *Peoples under Threat* is specifically designed to identify the risk of genocide, mass killing or other systematic violent repression, unlike most other early warning tools, which focus on violent conflict as such. Its primary application is civilian protection.

Indicators of conflict are included in the table's construction, however, as most, although not all, episodes of mass ethnic or religious killing occur during armed conflicts. War provides the state of emergency, domestic mobilization and justification, international cover, and in some cases the military and logistic capacity, that enable massacres to be carried out. Some massacres, however, occur in peacetime, or may accompany armed conflict from its inception, presenting a problem to risk models that focus exclusively on current conflicts. In addition, severe and even violent repression of minorities or indigenous peoples may occur for years before the onset of armed conflict provides the catalyst for larger scale killing.

The statistical indicators used all relate to the state. The state is the basic unit of enquiry, rather than particular ethnic or religious groups at risk, as governments or militias connected to the government are responsible for most cases of genocidal violence. Formally, the state will reserve to itself the monopoly over the legitimate means of violence, so that where non-state actors are responsible for widespread or continued killing, it usually occurs with either the complicity of the state or in a 'failed state' situation where the rule of law has disintegrated. Certain characteristics at the level of the state will

greatly increase the likelihood of atrocity, including habituation to illegal violence among the armed forces or police, prevailing impunity for human rights violations, official tolerance or encouragement of hate speech against particular groups, and in extreme cases, prior experience of mass killing. Egregious episodes of mass killing targeted principally at one group have also seen other groups deliberately decimated or destroyed.

However, some groups may experience higher levels of discrimination and be at greater risk than others in any given state. MRG has identified those groups in each state which we believe to be under most threat. (This does not mean that other groups or indeed the general population may not also be at some risk.) It should be noted that although these groups are most often minorities, in some cases ethnic or religious majorities will also be at risk and in relevant cases are therefore also listed in the table. In some cases, all the groups in the country are at risk of ethnic or sectarian killing.

The overall measure is based on a basket of ten indicators. These include indicators of democracy or good governance from the World Bank; conflict data from the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research and the Center for Systemic Peace; data on the flight of refugees, internally-displaced persons and other populations of concern from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); indicators of group division or elite factionalization from the Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; the US State Failure Task Force data on prior genocides and politicides; and the country credit risk classification published by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (as a proxy for trade openness). For citations and further information, see the notes to the table. For a fuller discussion of the methodology, see *State of the World's Minorities 2006*.

Based on current indicators from authoritative sources, *Peoples under Threat* seeks to identify those groups or peoples most under threat in 2018.



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Country	Groups	Conflict indicators			Indicators of population flight/group division			Democracy/governance indicators				Total
		A. Self-determination conflicts	B. Major armed conflict	C. Prior genocide/politicide	D. Flight of refugees and IDPs	E. Legacy of vengeance – group grievance	F. Rise of factionalized elites	G. Voice and accountability	H. Political stability	I. Rule of law	J. OECD country risk classification	
<b>Syria</b>	Political targets, Sunnis, Shi'a/Alawites, Yezidis, Christians, Druze, Kurds, Palestinians	5	2	1	0.6823	9.8	9.9	-1.959	-2.914	-2.006	7	28.360
<b>Somalia</b>	Minorities incl. Bantu, Benadiri and 'caste' groups (Gabooye etc.); clan members at risk in fighting incl. Hawiye, Darod, etc.	4	2	1	0.1791	8.9	10.0	-1.834	-2.330	-2.371	7	22.351
<b>South Sudan</b>	Murle, Nuer, Dinka, Anuak, Jie, Kachipo	0	2	1	0.3111	9.7	9.7	-1.671	-2.418	-1.692	7	21.000
<b>Iraq</b>	Shi'a, Sunnis, Kurds, Turkmen, Christians, Mandacans, Yezidis, Shabak, Faili Kurds, Bahá'is, Palestinians	5	2	1	0.1363	9.6	9.6	-1.010	-2.278	-1.701	7	20.927
<b>Sudan</b>	Fur, Zaghawa, Massalit and others in Darfur; Ngok Dinka, Nuba, Beja	5	2	1	0.0749	10.0	9.7	-1.797	-2.381	-1.262	7	20.847
<b>Afghanistan</b>	Hazara, Pashtun, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmen, Baluchis, Kuchis	4	2	1	0.1418	8.4	8.6	-1.086	-2.749	-1.616	7	20.577
<b>Dem. Rep. of the Congo</b>	Hema and Lendu, Hutu, Luba, Lunda, Tutsi/Banyamulenge, Batwa/Bambuti, other groups	4	2	1	0.0576	10.0	9.8	-1.390	-2.198	-1.614	7	19.953
<b>Yemen</b>	Zaydi Shi'a, Sunni tribes, al-Muhamasheen, Southerners	5	2	0	0.1051	9.3	9.5	-1.652	-2.794	-1.601	7	19.606
<b>Pakistan</b>	Shi'a (incl. Hazara), Ahmadis, Hindus, Christians and other religious minorities; Baluchis, Mohhajirs, Pashtun, Sindhis	5	2	1	0.0033	10.0	8.9	-0.688	-2.467	-0.830	7	18.543
<b>Ethiopia</b>	Anuak, Afars, Oromo, Somalis, smaller minorities	5	2	1	0.0016	9.1	8.7	-1.446	-1.569	-0.394	7	17.767
<b>Libya</b>	Black Libyans, Sub-Saharan migrants, Tebu, Berbers; religious targets	4	2	0	0.0495	8.1	9.4	-1.373	-2.208	-1.869	7	17.737
<b>Nigeria</b>	Ibo, Ijaw, Ogoni, Yoruba, Hausa (Muslims) and Christians in the North	5	2	1	0.0146	9.2	9.6	-0.295	-1.854	-1.054	6	17.232
<b>Central African Republic</b>	Muslims, Christians; Kaba (Sara), Mboum, Mbororo, Gula, Aka	0	2	0	0.2512	9.1	9.7	-1.129	-1.738	-1.843	7	17.230
<b>Burma/ Myanmar</b>	Kachin, Karenni, Karen, Mons, Rakhine, Rohingyas, Shan, Chin (Zomis), Wa	5	2	1	0.0173	9.7	8.3	-0.855	-0.634	-0.986	7	17.023
<b>Burundi</b>	Hutu, Tutsi, Batwa	0	1	1	0.0710	7.9	8.2	-1.510	-2.080	-1.389	7	15.997
<b>State of Palestine</b>	Gazans, Bedouin	5	1	0	0.0218	10.0	8.1	-1.169	-2.098	-0.306	7	14.933
<b>Ukraine</b>	Tatars, Krymchak and Karaites in Crimea; Russians, Hungarians, Moldovans and other national minorities	5	2	0	0.0461	6.7	8.0	0.024	-1.891	-0.765	7	14.918
<b>Egypt</b>	Copts, Shi'a, Bahá'is; Nubians, Bedouin	5	2	0	0.0004	8.8	8.8	-1.226	-1.419	-0.410	6	14.742
<b>Eritrea</b>	Afars, Saho, Tigre, religious minorities	4	0	0	0.1069	7.1	8.1	-2.097	-0.882	-1.527	7	14.483
<b>Iran</b>	Arabs, Azeris, Bahá'is, Baluchis, Kurds, Turkomen	4	1	1	0.0023	9.3	9.6	-1.386	-0.745	-0.712	5	14.391
<b>Russian Federation</b>	Chechens, Ingush and others in North Caucasus; indigenous northern peoples, Roma, Jews, Central Asians, migrants	5	1	1	0.0007	8.8	8.1	-1.212	-0.894	-0.800	4	13.979

Country	Groups	Conflict indicators			Indicators of population flight/group division			Democracy/governance indicators				Total
		A. Self-determination conflicts	B. Major armed conflict	C. Prior genocide/politicide	D. Flight of refugees and IDPs	E. Legacy of vengeance – group grievance	F. Rise of factionalized elites	G. Voice and accountability	H. Political stability	I. Rule of law	J. OECD country risk classification	
Turkey	Kurds, Alevis, Roma, Armenians and other Christians	5	2	0	0.0010	10.0	9.1	-0.635	-1.998	-0.162	4	13.488
Zimbabwe	Ndebele, Europeans, political/social targets	2	0	1	0.0037	7.3	9.8	-1.113	-0.613	-1.324	7	13.312
Philippines	Indigenous peoples, Moros (Muslims), Chinese	5	2	1	0.0056	7.9	8.0	0.143	-1.303	-0.396	3	13.137
Equatorial Guinea	Bubi, Annobon Islanders	1	0	1	0.0002	6.3	8.2	-1.926	-0.193	-1.436	7	12.849
Angola	Bakongo, Cabindans, Ovimbundu, Pastoralists, San and Kvisi	4	0	1	0.0012	7.5	7.2	-1.167	-0.387	-1.081	6	12.847
Lebanon	Druze, Maronite Christians, Palestinians, Shi'a, Sunnis	2	1	0	0.0023	8.5	9.3	-0.523	-1.555	-0.859	7	12.552
Chad	'Black African' groups, Arabs, Southerners	2	0	0	0.0108	8.0	9.8	-1.343	-1.208	-1.427	7	12.428
Uganda	Acholi, Karamojong, Bakonzo, Bamba, Basongora, Batwa	4	0	1	0.0045	8.5	8.6	-0.712	-0.723	-0.244	6	12.324
Mali	Tuareg, Arabs, Maure, and others in the north	4	1	0	0.0127	7.4	4.9	-0.182	-1.548	-0.780	7	12.312
Cameroon	'Westerners', Southerners, Bakassi	2	1	0	0.0104	8.3	9.1	-1.026	-0.950	-1.019	6	11.999
Algeria	Berbers, Saharawi	2	1	1	0.0002	7.1	7.1	-0.877	-1.139	-0.849	4	11.984
China	Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongols, Hui, religious minorities	5	1	1	0.0002	7.9	7.2	-1.616	-0.521	-0.224	2	11.880
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croats, Bosniac Muslims, Serbs, Roma	2	0	1	0.0488	7.0	8.7	-0.164	-0.378	-0.295	7	11.317
Venezuela	Indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants	0	0	0	0.0028	7.2	8.2	-1.135	-1.026	-2.178	7	11.309
Colombia	Political/social targets, Afro-descendants, indigenous peoples	2	2	0	0.1600	7.3	7.6	0.096	-0.960	-0.317	4	11.264
North Korea	Political/social targets, religious minorities	0	0	0	0.0001	5.8	8.5	-2.132	-0.711	-1.632	7	11.234
Azerbaijan	Armenians	4	0	0	0.0643	6.5	7.9	-1.603	-0.870	-0.566	5	11.207
Tajikistan	Uzbeks, Pamiris, Russians	1	0	0	0.0005	7.4	8.4	-1.672	-0.792	-1.178	7	11.155
Sri Lanka	Tamils, Muslims	4	0	1	0.0083	9.0	8.8	-0.110	0.067	-0.007	6	10.850
Mozambique	Northerners	4	0	0	0.0009	5.4	6.6	-0.394	-1.049	-1.018	7	10.845
Thailand	Chinese, Malay-Muslims, Northern Hill Tribes	5	1	0	0.0000	8.5	9.4	-1.101	-0.929	0.012	3	10.626
Kenya	Borana, Kalenjin, Kikuyu, Luhya, Luo, Somalis, Turkana, Endorois, Masai, Ogiek, other indigenous groups, Muslims	1	1	0	0.0002	8.9	8.9	-0.147	-1.327	-0.530	6	10.473
Kyrgyzstan	Uzbeks, Russians	2	0	0	0.0008	8.4	8.0	-0.490	-0.656	-1.095	7	10.357
Cambodia	Cham, Vietnamese, indigenous hill tribes (Khmer Leou)	0	0	1	0.0008	6.9	8.3	-1.143	0.178	-1.096	6	10.352
Niger	Djerema-songhai, Hausa, Tuaregs	2	0	0	0.0070	8.0	8.9	-0.339	-1.084	-0.641	7	10.326
Uzbekistan	Tajiks, Islamic political groups, religious minorities, Karakalpaks, Russians	1	0	0	0.0002	7.1	8.8	-1.887	-0.344	-1.133	6	10.266
Turkmenistan	Uzbeks, Russians, Kazakhs, religious minorities	0	0	0	0.0003	6.6	7.8	-2.128	-0.312	-1.558	6	10.151
Congo (Rep.)	Lari, M'Boshi, Aka	1	0	0	0.0187	7.2	6.7	-1.160	-0.566	-1.042	7	10.147

Country	Groups	Conflict indicators			Indicators of population flight/group division			Democracy/governance indicators				Total
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Djibouti	Afars	1	0	0	0.0029	6.5	7.3	-1.320	-0.628	-0.971	7	10.123
El Salvador	Political/social targets	0	2	1	0.0172	6.7	4.3	0.278	-0.060	-0.707	5	10.119
Rwanda	Hutu, Tutsi, Batwa	0	0	1	0.0251	9.4	8.0	-1.215	-0.050	0.070	6	10.096
Bangladesh	Ahmadis, Hindus, other religious minorities; Chittagong Hill Tribes	3	0	0	0.0003	8.7	9.3	-0.558	-1.241	-0.590	5	10.017
Cote d'Ivoire	Northern Mande (Dioula), Senoufo, Bete, newly-settled groups	3	0	0	0.0028	8.1	9.1	-0.284	-0.902	-0.671	6	10.002
Kosovo	Serbs, Roma/Ashkali/Egyptians, Bosniaks, Turks, Gorani	4	0	0	0.0307	7.3	8.0	-0.160	-0.205	-0.384	7	9.981
Guinea	Fulani (Peul), Malinke	0	0	0	0.0036	8.6	9.6	-0.732	-0.407	-1.289	7	9.872
Laos	Hmong, other highland peoples	2	0	0	0.0011	6.6	8.3	-1.729	0.499	-0.765	7	9.864
Moldova	Trans-Dniester Slavs	4	0	0	0.0018	7.3	8.3	-0.033	-0.277	-0.536	7	9.839
Nepal	Madheshis (Terai), Dalits, Janajati, linguistic minorities	2	0	0	0.0006	9.4	8.8	-0.234	-0.794	-0.839	6	9.656
Guinea Bissau	Balanta, Fula (Fulani), Manjaco, Mandinga, Papel, Ejamat (Felupe), Jola (Diola), Susu, Cape Verdeans	0	0	0	0.0021	5.2	9.6	-0.701	-0.504	-1.491	7	9.559
Haiti	Political/social targets	0	0	0	0.0090	6.5	9.6	-0.730	-0.674	-0.999	7	9.551
Vietnam	Montagnards (Degar), other highland peoples, religious minorities	2	0	1	0.0035	6.0	6.9	-1.407	0.169	0.048	5	9.500
Mauritania	Haratins ('Black Moors'), Kewri	0	0	0	0.0099	7.0	8.8	-0.831	-0.736	-0.777	7	9.451
Papua New Guinea	Bougainvilleans, tribal peoples	4	0	0	0.0001	6.3	7.1	0.190	-0.495	-0.754	6	9.043
Georgia	Adzhars, Abkhazians, South Ossetians	4	0	0	0.0757	7.9	9.1	0.217	-0.286	0.367	6	9.042
Guatemala	Indigenous peoples, Garifuna	0	0	1	0.0044	8.5	7.1	-0.308	-0.537	-1.040	4	9.029
Gambia, The		0	0	0	0.0159	3.8	7.8	-1.275	-0.521	-0.747	7	9.010
Mexico	Mayans, Indigenous peoples, Zapotecs	2	2	0	0.0007	7.2	5.4	-0.089	-0.766	-0.503	3	8.840
Serbia	Bosniaks, Ethnic Albanians, Croats, Roma	2	0	1	0.0307	7.3	8.0	0.213	0.047	-0.115	5	8.837
India	Assamese, Bodos, Nagas, Tripuras, other Adivasis; Kashmiris, Sikhs, Muslims, Dalits	5	1	0	0.0000	8.3	7.3	0.414	-0.955	-0.070	3	8.836

## Notes to Table

Sources of the indicators are as follows:

- **Conflict indicators:** The base data used was from the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (Conflict Barometer 2016, Heidelberg, HIIK, 2017), Minority Rights Group International, and the Center for Systemic Peace ('Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946-2016' (Center for Systemic Peace, 2017). Self-determination/autonomy conflicts in 2016 were ranked on a scale of 0-5 as follows: 5=ongoing armed conflict; 4=contained armed conflict; 3=settled armed conflict; 2=militant politics; 1=conventional politics. Major armed

conflicts were classified as 2=ongoing in late 2016; 1=emerging from conflict since 2012 or ongoing conflict with deaths under 1,000.

- **Prior genocide or politicide:** Harff, US Political Instability Task Force (formerly State Failure Task Force). 1=one or more episodes since 1945, updated using MRG data.
- **Indicators of Flight and Group Division:** Data for the flight of refugees and IDPs comes from UN High Commissioner for Refugees, total population of concern by country of origin, Mid-Year Trends 2016, as a proportion of total country population (population figures from UN DESA, 2015 revision). Group division

indicators are from the Fragile States Index, Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2016.

- **Democracy/Governance Indicators:** Annual Governance Indicators, World Bank, 2016.
- **OECD country risk classification:** Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 'Country Risk Classifications of the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits', January 2017.

Data for Kosovo include some indicators relating to Serbia. Data for the State of Palestine include some indicators

relating to both Israel/Palestine; data relating to Palestinian refugees include those under the UNHCR mandate only. Indicators were rebased as necessary to give an approximate equal weighting to the five categories above, with the exception of the prior geno-/politicide indicator. As a dichotomous variable this received a lesser weighting to avoid too great a distortion to the final ranking. Resulting values were then summed.

The full formula is:  

$$(A/2) + (Bx1.25) + (Cx2) + (Dx10) + (E+F)/6 + (G+H+I)/-1 + (Jx0.625)$$